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If they aren’t paid, people don’t work. This fundamental economic prin-
ciple is dramatically demonstrated by social security provisions and retire-
ment. The social security programs in most developed countries are ﬁ-
nanced on a pay-as-you-go basis. Under this arrangement, most countries
have accumulated large unfunded liabilities and, in many countries, face
looming ﬁnancial burdens. The aging of the populations in almost all
countries is often cited as the reason for the ﬁnancial burdens faced by the
social security programs. Many of the programs are very generous and thus
are increasingly costly as the population ages because there is a greater pro-
portion of the population retired and collecting beneﬁts, relative to the
fraction of the population that is in the labor force and paying for the ben-
eﬁts. Perhaps just as important, although not as widely appreciated, is that
the provisions of the programs themselves typically encourage retirement
by reducing pay for work. This penalty on work induces older employees
to leave the labor force early and thus magniﬁes the ﬁnancial burden
caused by population aging.
This volume represents the second stage of a research project to study
the relationship between social security provisions and retirement. The
ﬁrst stage of the project is reported in Gruber and Wise (1999). In that vol-
ume, we documented the enormous disincentives for continued work at
older ages in many countries. The analysis also revealed a strong corre-
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retire early and the proportion of older persons that has left the labor force.
The weight of the evidence suggested that this relationship was largely
causal. The results of the second phase strongly aﬃrm the causal relation-
ship between retirement and social security incentives to quit work.
In this second stage, we turn to country-by-country analysis of retire-
ment behavior based on micro-data. The research teams in each of twelve
countries compiled comprehensive, large databases of individuals. The
data in each country match information on retirement decisions to the re-
tirement incentives inherent in the social security provisions of each coun-
try. Retirement models were estimated based on the micro-data. The re-
sults show the enormous eﬀect of social security incentives on retirement,
and the uniformity of ﬁndings is striking. In every country, the quantitative
magnitude of the incentive-program eﬀects on retirement is very large.
The key advantage of this micro-estimation approach is that in each
country the eﬀects on retirement of changes in social security provisions
can be predicted. To demonstrate the eﬀect of such changes, the country
papers in this volume include simulations of the eﬀects of two illustrative
reforms: One illustrative reform delays the beneﬁt eligibility ages in each
country. A second illustrative reform assumes common provisions in each
of the countries—reducing retirement incentives in some countries and in-
creasing incentives in other countries. Under the ﬁrst reform, the simula-
tions show a large reduction in retirement in each country, and a corre-
sponding increase in the labor force participation of older workers in each
country. Under the second reform, the simulations show an increase in re-
tirement in some countries and a decrease in other countries, in accordance
with the relationship between the current country provisions and the com-
mon reform provisions.
In short, the ﬁndings conﬁrm the conclusions based on the ﬁrst stage of
this ongoing project and, in addition, illustrate the enormous magnitude of
the eﬀect that changes in social security provisions would have on retire-
ment and thus the labor force participation of older people.
Like the ﬁrst stage, this second stage of the project relies on the analyses
of a large group of economists who conduct the analysis for each of their
countries. The authors of the individual country papers in this volume are
Belgium: Arnaud Dellis, Raphaël Desmet, Alain Jousten, and Sergio Perel-
man;
Canada: Michael Baker, Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan;
Denmark: Paul Bingley, Nabanita Datta Gupta, and Peder J. Pedersen;
France: Didier Blanchet and Ronan Mahieu;
Germany: Axel Börsch-Supan, Simone Kohnz, Giovanni Mastrobuoni,
and Reinhold Schnabel;
Italy: Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi;
Japan: Takashi Oshio and Akiko Oishi;
2J onathan Gruber and David A. WiseThe Netherlands: Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos;
Spain: Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco Peracchi;
Sweden: Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson;
The United Kingdom: Richard Blundell, Costas Meghir, and Sara Smith;
and
The United States: Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruber.
The central feature of the project is the presentation of comparable anal-
ysis in each of the countries. Each of the country studies follows essentially
the same format, although country-speciﬁc issues are often discussed as
part of the analysis done for that particular country.
Background: The First Stage
The goal of the ﬁrst stage of the project was to describe the incentives in-
herent in the social security provisions in the project countries and to re-
late the incentives to the labor force participation of older workers. Each
of the studies in the ﬁrst volume begins with a description of the historical
evolution of labor force participation and then presents data on the current
age-speciﬁc activities and income sources of men and women. Each of the
papers presents data for men and women in nine areas:
1. Labor force participation rates by age interval between 1960 and the
present;
2. The proportion of employees covered by the public pension system
and the proportion of persons over ﬁfty-ﬁve receiving public pensions
from 1960 to the present;
3. Replacement rates under the public pension system from 1960 to the
present;
4. Current labor force participation rates by age;
5. Labor force status—employed, unemployed, disability, or retired;
6. Proportion receiving various public pensions—such as old age, dis-
ability, or survivor—by age;
7. Proportions receiving employer-provided pensions by age;
8. Source of household income by age;
9. Retirement and public pension hazard rates by age.
Each paper then describes the institutional features of the country’s social
security system, highlighting any interactions with other public and private
programs that might also inﬂuence retirement behavior. The core of each
paper is a detailed analysis of the retirement incentives inherent in the pro-
visions of that country’s retirement income system. By making the same
analytic calculations and by presenting the same simulations in each of the
countries, the individual studies provide a means of comparing the retire-
ment incentives among the countries.
Because it provides the background and the motivation for the continu-
Introduction and Summary 3ing project, we summarize here the key results from the ﬁrst stage of the
project. The decline in the labor force participation of older persons is per-
haps the most dramatic feature of labor force change over the past several
decades. The decline has been striking in all but one of the countries stud-
ied here. The labor force participation rates of men aged sixty to sixty-four
for the years 1960 to 1996 are shown for each of the eleven countries in ﬁg-
ure 1, which for ease of exposition is presented in two panels. (Denmark
was added to the project after the ﬁrst stage was completed.) The decline
was substantial in each of the countries, but was much greater in some
countries than in others. In the early 1960s, the participation rates were
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Fig. 1 LFP trends for men ages 60 to 64: A, Japan, Sweden, US, UK, Germany,
Belgium; B, Japan, Spain, Netherlands, France, Italyabove 70 percent in each of the countries and above 80 percent in several
countries. By the mid-1990s, the rate had fallen to below 20 percent in Bel-
gium, Italy, France, and the Netherlands. It had fallen to about 35 percent
in Germany and 40 percent in Spain. Although U.S. analysts have often
emphasized the “dramatic” fall in that country, the U.S. decline from 82
percent to 53 percent was modest in comparison to the much more precip-
itous decline in these European countries. The decline to 57 percent in
Sweden was also large, but modest when compared to the fall in other
countries. Japan stands out with the smallest decline of all the countries,
from about 83 percent to 75 percent. Each of the country papers presents
completely parallel labor force and other data for men and women, in-
cluding current labor force participation and labor force departure rates by
age, which are key components of the analysis in this volume.
By considering the labor force participation rates by age in each country
it is possible to calculate the proportion of persons in a given age interval
who were out of the labor force. These unused-productive-capacity mea-
sures for all of the countries are shown in ﬁgure 2, for men in the age range
from ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-ﬁve. For the entire age range from ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-
ﬁve, unused capacity ranges from 67 percent in Belgium to 22 percent in
Japan. The goal was then to consider how this measure of labor force par-
ticipation was related to the provisions of the social security programs in
the countries.
The incentive measure calculated in this ﬁrst volume was the implicit so-
cial security tax on work. To understand that measure, it is useful to think
of wage compensation for working an additional year in two components.
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Fig. 2 Unused productive capacityThe ﬁrst is wage earnings. The second component is the increase in the ex-
pected present discounted value of promised future social security bene-
ﬁts, known as the accrual in social security wealth (SSW), which is equal to
SSW t 1– SSW t. It is natural to think of this diﬀerence as positive, or at least
not negative—that is, if a person works for an additional year and thus for-
goes one year of beneﬁts, it might be expected that beneﬁts begun one year
later would be increased enough to oﬀset the fact that they are received for
one fewer years. This is true, for example, for the typical worker in the
United States: If a worker forgoes claiming beneﬁts at the earliest possible
age (sixty-two) and works another year, subsequent beneﬁts are increased
by 6.67 percent to account for the fact that beneﬁts will be received for one
fewer year.
In most of the countries studied in this project, however, the accrual is
signiﬁcantly negative. This is a consequence in large part of not increasing
beneﬁts enough if the age of beneﬁt receipt is delayed so that beneﬁts are
not “actuarially fair.” Thus, what the worker gains in wage earnings is par-
tially, or even largely, oﬀset by a loss in future social security beneﬁts. We
call the ratio of this loss to wage earnings (after tax) the social security im-
plicit tax on earnings. In many countries this tax can be 80 percent or more
at certain ages. Suppose that the tax rates for each of the years from the
early retirement to age sixty-nine are summed: We call this the tax force to
retire. It is shown for all the countries in ﬁgure 3.
The relationship between the (logarithm of the) tax force to retire and
the proportion of men age ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-ﬁve that is out of the labor
force (unused capacity) is shown in ﬁgure 4. There is a striking correspon-
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Fig. 3 Sum of tax rates on work from early retirement age to 69dence between the two series, showing a clear relationship between the so-
cial security tax on work and departure from the labor force. A number of
examples in the previous volume, some of which are replicated below, sug-
gest that the relationship is largely causal. We concluded in the introduc-
tion to that volume that:
It is clear that there is a strong correspondence between the age at which
beneﬁts are available and departure from the labor force. Social security
programs often provide generous retirement beneﬁts at young ages. In
addition, the provisions of these programs often imply large ﬁnancial
penalties on labor earnings beyond the social security early retirement
age. We conclude that social security program provisions have indeed
contributed to the decline in the labor force participation of older per-
sons, substantially reducing the potential productive capacity of the la-
bor force. It seems evident that if the trend to early retirement is to be
reversed, as will almost surely be dictated by demographic trends,
changing the provisions of social security programs that induce early re-
tirement will play a key role. (Gruber and Wise 1999, 35)
The Second Stage Analysis and Issues
The ﬁrst stage of this project established two key ﬁndings: (a) The social
security systems in many countries provide enormous incentives to leave
the labor force at older ages, and (b) A strong correspondence exists be-
tween social security incentives to retire and the withdrawal of older work-
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Fig. 4 Unused capacity versus tax forceers from the labor force. This implies that social security incentives to re-
tire are likely an important cause of the low labor force participation of
older workers in many countries. The relationships in the ﬁrst volume,
however, do not provide a means of estimating the magnitude of the eﬀect
on labor force participation of changes in plan provisions.
Thus, in this second stage of the project, we undertake analysis to esti-
mate how much the retirement age would change if social security provi-
sions were changed, based on within-country analysis of the determinants
of retirement. The analysis is based on the micro-data for each country that
considers the relationship between retirement and the incentives faced by
individual employees. That is, rather than considering system-wide incen-
tives for representative persons (such as those with median earning histo-
ries) and comparing these incentives with aggregate labor force participa-
tion across countries, we now turn to micro-econometric analyses within
countries. The results of these analyses are based on diﬀerences in individ-
ual circumstances within a given country.
This approach has two key advantages. First, the analyses in this volume
show that social security retirement incentives have very similar eﬀects on
labor force participation in all countries. In particular, the results strongly
conﬁrm that the relationship between labor force participation and retire-
ment across countries is not the result of cultural diﬀerences among coun-
tries that could yield diﬀerent norms for work at older ages. That is, the
within-country analyses show similar responses to retirement incentive
eﬀects, even though the countries diﬀer with respect to cultural histories
and institutions.
Second, the analysis of micro-data also allows consideration of several
features of social security systems, as well as individual attributes, that may
simultaneously aﬀect retirement decisions. In particular, we can consider
jointly the age at which beneﬁts are ﬁrst available and the incentive to re-
tire once beneﬁts are available. The ﬁrst stage of the project showed that
both of these features were important determinants of retirement.
The importance of beneﬁt eligibility ages presents a particular chal-
lenge for the analyses in this volume. We believe that much of the eﬀect of
social security provisions is likely to be through the choice of beneﬁt eligi-
bility ages, which in some instances may tend to establish social norms for
retirement. For example, a common ﬁnding of many of the analyses in this
volume is that even very detailed models of retirement incentives cannot
explain the large jumps in retirement rates at normal and early entitlement
ages. As a result, the retirement eﬀects of major system reforms (like rais-
ing the early entitlement age) may be greatly understated by comparisons
among individuals within a given retirement income system who all face
the same eligibility ages. In addition, small private saving may limit the
option of most persons to retire before pension beneﬁts are available
(many people are liquidity constrained), and such eﬀects may not be cap-
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issue.
In addition, as emphasized in the ﬁrst volume, unemployment and dis-
ability beneﬁts often provide early retirement income before the nominal
social security normal retirement age. Thus in many countries, to estimate
the eﬀect of the plan provisions on retirement, it is necessary to consider
all three programs jointly, which the micro-econometric analyses in this
volume accomplish.
Considered jointly, we believe that the analyses in this volume provide
overwhelming conﬁrmation that the provisions of social security programs
play a key role in the determination of retirement decisions. This result
complements the conclusion from the ﬁrst stage of the analysis. In addi-
tion, the estimates in this volume allow prediction of the eﬀects on retire-
ment of changes in program provisions as well as the eﬀect of changes on
program costs, which will be taken up in the next stage of the project.
As in the ﬁrst volume, the analysis in each country follows a template so
that results can be compared across countries. The micro-analysis in each
country is based on a sample of individuals. In some cases, the data come
largely from administrative records. In other cases, the data were obtained
from special surveys. The coverage is not precisely the same in each coun-
try. For example, the data for Italy pertain to private sector workers only,
excluding public sector employees. Nonetheless, it has been possible to es-
timate the same models in each country, even though the population cov-
ered by the country data sets may diﬀer in some respects.
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the incentive measures used in the anal-
ysis, as well as other features of the model speciﬁcations. The alternative
incentive measures are constructed economic variables that describe the ﬁ-
nancial gain or loss from continuing to work. Then we discuss the method
used to obtain estimates when there are multiple routes to retirement. Next
we brieﬂy summarize the parameter estimates obtained in the analyses
across the twelve countries.
In the next section, we discuss a key empirical regularity that strongly in-
ﬂuences the analyses undertaken in this volume: the correspondence be-
tween beneﬁt eligibility ages and retirement decisions.
In the concluding section we describe the simulations undertaken to
summarize the implications of the estimated models, and discuss the sim-
ulation results. The simulations describe the eﬀect of illustrative policy
changes. The goal is to provide an understanding of the nature of the ﬁnd-
ings, focusing on selected portions of the analyses described in detail in the
country papers. The simulations demonstrate the implications of the re-
tirement model estimates.
As part of this discussion, we take some care to explain the diﬀerent
methods of simulation that are used in the analysis and why certain fea-
tures of the simulation methods are of key importance. A central aspect of
Introduction and Summary 9the analysis is experimentation with various approaches to estimation and
to simulations based on the estimates. The aim is to determine the most re-
liable methods to use in the subsequent stages of the project.
Some of the discussion is necessarily somewhat technical. We believe,
however, that it is important to present an overview of the critical features
of the analysis so that readers can approach the individual country papers
with a broad understanding of the issues and rationale behind the ap-
proach taken in the country analyses. Thus, in the text of this introduction,
we have explained the main features of the analysis and have included some
additional, more technical detail in an appendix.
The Estimation Models: Incentive Measures and Control Variables
The goal of the analysis in the country papers is to estimate the proba-
bility of retirement based on the provisions of the country’s social security
system—which provides diﬀerential incentives depending on individual
employee circumstances—and on other individual attributes of employ-
ees. The focus of the analysis is the plan provisions. In particular, the way
the incentives to retire, inherent in plan provisions, are in fact related to the
retirement choices that individuals make. There are several ways that the
incentives might be measured. All of the measures describe the ﬁnancial
gain or loss from continuing work. The speciﬁcations used in the country
papers are summarized in the following table. The most important variable
in each speciﬁcation is the incentive measure, which is noted across the top
of the table. In addition to these measures, the models control for various
other variables (covariates).
The speciﬁcations are summarized in table 1. Each of the speciﬁcations
includes SSW. The expectation is that, all else equal, persons with greater
SSW are more likely to retire. In principle, total wealth should be con-
trolled for, but in most countries the data do not provide measures of other
forms of wealth.
The focus of the analysis is on forward-looking measures of the incen-
tive for retirement, or for continued work. A natural starting point is a
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Table 1 Estimation Method (Incentive Measure) and Variables
Estimation Method (Incentive Measure)
Single Year
Variables Accrual Peak Value Option Value
SSW XXXXXX
Linear age X X X
Individual age indicators X X X
Earnings XXXXXX
Sector XXXXXX
Demographics XXXXXXmeasure that looks ahead only one year, the single-year accrual measure.
This measure captures the eﬀect of another year of work on future bene-
ﬁts. Thus, as a basis for comparison, the country analyses present the
single-year accrual incentive measure.
However, it has been shown in other contexts,1 as well as in the ﬁrst vol-
ume of this project, that the ﬁnancial gain from continuing to work may
vary from year to year. That is, the gain from working one more year may
be large, for example, but once that single additional year is worked, the
gain from working one more year may be small or even negative. Likewise,
the gain from one more year may be small, but might then be followed by
a year of large gain. In this case, a person who decides to retire based on
looking forward just one year, would forego the gain in pension wealth that
would be gained by continuing to work for two years. Thus a key principle
of the approach followed here is that the estimation should account for the
pension accrual not just in the next year, but many years into the future.
The benchmark approach for considering the entire future path of ac-
cruals is the option value model.2 To summarize, this model evaluates the
expected present discounted value of incomes for all possible future retire-
ment ages and then measures the value of retirement today versus the value
at the optimal date (perhaps today, but more likely in the future). If look-
ing ahead suggests gains from work at some time in the future, there is an
incentive for the person to remain in the labor force to take advantage of
these gains.
The relationship between the measures can be explained brieﬂy. As pre-
viously described, the social security accrual from one year to the next is
given by:
(1) SSW t 1   SSW t
That is, this measure describes the change in promised future social secu-
rity beneﬁts from working one additional year.
A simpliﬁed version of the option value measure at age t can be de-
scribed by
Simpliﬁed OV t(r∗)
(2)                
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1. For example, see Lazear (1983), Kotlikoﬀ and Wise (1985, 1989), and Coile and Gruber
(2000a).
2. See Stock and Wise (1990a,b).In this formulation, a person considering whether to retire at age t consid-
ers the present value of beneﬁts if he retires now (at age t) with the beneﬁts
if he retires at some later time. If the person retires at some later age he will
gain from future wage earnings and from any gain in future pension bene-
ﬁts. The gain in wage earnings is represented by the ﬁrst bracket and the
gain in pension beneﬁts by the diﬀerence between the terms in the second
bracket. The age at which the total of the two components is the greatest is
denoted by r∗. The option value prescription is that the person will con-
tinue to work if this option value is positive.
Notice that the option value approach as set out above combines both of
the components of compensation from working: one component is wage
earnings, the other is the change in promised future social security beneﬁts.
We label this second component the peak value.3 It includes only social se-
curity beneﬁts and not wage earnings. The peak value occurs at the age that
gives the greatest discounted value of social security beneﬁt. That age need
not be at r∗, although for simplicity the two are assumed to be the same in
this description. A more precise discussion of the diﬀerences in the mea-
sures is presented in the appendix.
As previously emphasized, a crucial issue in the analyses in this volume
is identiﬁcation—that is, determination of the separate eﬀect of each vari-
able on retirement, as distinct from each of the other variables. Determin-
ing the eﬀect of plan incentives on retirement is a key goal, but other indi-
vidual attributes also inﬂuence the decision to retire. For example, persons
are more likely to prefer retirement to work as they age. A linear age vari-
able will potentially capture this eﬀect, but only if preferences for leisure
evolve linearly with age. Individual wage diﬀerences may also proxy for
diﬀerences in the preference for work versus retirement. A wage-earning
covariate may help to control for this form of heterogeneity among individ-
uals. But both age and wage earnings also determine in part the value of the
incentive measures. Thus, including age and wage covariates may make it
more diﬃcult to accurately determine the eﬀect of the incentive measures
or to accurately isolate the program incentive eﬀects from the eﬀect of
worker heterogeneity. To put it another way, the importance of controlling
for diﬀerences in taste regarding work may suggest the inclusion of the wage
and age variables, separate from their incorporation in the option value. But
there is a countervailing consideration: Much of the estimated eﬀect of
these variables is likely to reﬂect the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial incentives and not
individual heterogeneity. Thus, the full eﬀect of the program incentives may
be understated when the separate age and earnings controls are included.
The issue of identiﬁcation also arises in considering the option value as
compared with the peak value incentive measures. If individual hetero-
geneity were not a concern, the option value measure would be the most
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3. As proposed by Coile and Gruber (2000a,b).parsimonious incentive measure to use, as it captures the full ﬁnancial in-
centive on retirement of both future wage earnings and retirement beneﬁts
combined. But, to the extent that wages proxy for the taste for work, the op-
tion value variation across individuals may reﬂect in part this wage proxy
for heterogeneity, rather than the ﬁnancial retirement incentive. The peak
value measure recognizes this possibility by measuring the retirement in-
centive by the future stream of retirement beneﬁts only, without including
the future stream of wage earnings. But to the extent that future wage earn-
ings have an important incentive inﬂuence on retirement, the peak value
approach understates the full eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives on retirement.
Perhaps the most important identiﬁcation issue arises when age-speciﬁc
variables are included to estimate the retirement eﬀect of program eligibil-
ity ages. It is common to ﬁnd that the retirement rate at certain ages is
larger (or smaller) than would be predicted on the basis of an incentive
measure alone. For example, in the United States, the retirement rate at age
sixty-ﬁve is noticeably higher than is predicted based on ﬁnancial incen-
tives alone. Perhaps this is due to a customary retirement age eﬀect: Since
age sixty-ﬁve is the normal retirement age, many employees may think that
age sixty-ﬁve is the age to retire. In addition, in virtually no instance in any
country do employees typically retire before some form of retirement ben-
eﬁts are available. The retirement rate at the early retirement age—the age
at which a person is ﬁrst eligible for beneﬁts—is typically substantially
greater than would be predicted on the basis of ﬁnancial measures alone.
This empirical regularity likely reﬂects a liquidity constraint; most em-
ployees have not saved enough to retire without receiving public social se-
curity or employer-provided pension beneﬁts. To capture this eﬀect, some
of the speciﬁcations allow an indicator variable for each age. These indica-
tor variables allow retirement to jump or decline at each age, after control-
ling for the ﬁnancial incentive measures. But the inclusion of these age in-
dicator variables in particular raises the identiﬁcation question: Here, the
issue is whether the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial incentive measures can be distin-
guished from the eﬀect on retirement of plan eligibility ages. This is a crit-
ical issue and is discussed in more detail later.
There is no right answer to these identiﬁcation dilemmas. The country
analyses in this volume follow what is perhaps a conservative as well as a
ﬂexible approach. All of the speciﬁcations control for background vari-
ables, including sex, education, industry of employment, and both current
and average lifetime earnings. This is the conservative part. The ﬂexibility
is reﬂected in the diﬀerent incentive measure speciﬁcations, each estimated
using linear age and then again using indicator variables for each age. In
this way the sensitivity of the ﬁndings to diﬀerent incentive measures and
to the controls that are included in the analysis can be assessed.
One additional note on estimation: The option value model as set out by
Stock and Wise, and in several subsequent applications, was estimated by
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ters. In this cross-country context, however, we concluded that that ap-
proach would likely pose numerical complexities that would best be
avoided for this comparative analysis over a large number of countries.
Thus the estimation undertaken in the papers in this volume is typically
based on a regression counterpart to the option value model as well as two
other approaches, as previously explained. In some countries, however, the
option value parameters in the Stock and Wise speciﬁcation have been es-
timated by a grid search, and in other instances the Stock and Wise option
value parameter estimates have been used to calculate the option value that
is used in the regression. In at least one country, the option value model was
estimated by maximum likelihood.
Multiple Retirement Options
In some countries, like the United States, social security is the single
public program that provides retirement beneﬁts to the vast majority of re-
tirees. The only retirement decision is then at what age to choose to retire
under this program. (A small fraction of persons retire under the public
disability program and many employees are covered by employer-provided
pension plans.) In other countries, however, there are two or more pro-
grams under which a person can retire. Germany is a good example.
Figure 5 shows paths to retirement for men in Germany between 1960
and 1995. The ﬁgure shows clearly the changes in the pathways to retire-
ment after the 1972 reform, which is discussed later. Here, we draw atten-
tion to the multiple paths to retirement. All persons are eligible to retire at
age sixty-ﬁve, the social security program normal retirement age, but only
a small proportion of employees work until that age. A large fraction of
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Fig. 5 Germany: Pathways to retirement for men, 1960 to 1995
Source: Data provided by Axel Börsch-Supan.employees retires under the disability program before age sixty. Others re-
tire under the social security disability program available after age sixty.
Some can retire under the social security system unemployment program
after age sixty. Still others are eligible to retire at age sixty-three under the
ﬂexible retirement program that allows persons with long service to retire
at that age—essentially the early retirement age. In addition to these pro-
grams, liberal interpretation of unemployment plan provisions allows per-
sons to retire with unemployment beneﬁts before age sixty. Whether a
given person is eligible for a program depends on speciﬁc plan provisions,
like eligibility for ﬂexible retirement at age sixty-three. Eligibility for other
programs, like disability or unemployment, is uncertain.
In Germany, the approach is to assign (or predict) eligibility probabili-
ties for each of the programs at each age, depending on the empirical prob-
abilities of retirement under each of the programs at that age. Then the in-
centive measures are weighted averages, with the weights given by the
probabilities. This instrumental variable method is described in more de-
tail in the appendix, using the situation in Denmark as an example.
Parameter Estimates
We do not attempt in this introduction to provide a detailed discussion
of the estimates. Rather, we rely on the simulations based on the parame-
ter estimates to indicate the implications of the estimated models. The sim-
ulations are later discussed. Here we highlight the strikingly common ﬁnd-
ing in virtually all the country papers: The retirement incentives inherent
in most social security programs are strongly related to early retirement.
The estimation results are summarized in table 2. For each incentive
speciﬁcation, the table shows the sign and the statistical signiﬁcance (at the
5 percent level) of the estimated eﬀect of the incentive measure. The table
also shows the sign and the statistical signiﬁcance of SSW. For each incen-
tive measure, the sign and signiﬁcance level are shown when linear age is
used and when the age-speciﬁc indicator variables are used.
The results in table 2 are striking. In ten of the twelve countries, almost
all of the estimated incentive measure eﬀects are negatively related to re-
tirement and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. (With respect to the follow-
ing discussion, it is also notable that the sign and signiﬁcance of the incen-
tive measures rarely depends on whether age indicator variables are used in
the speciﬁcation.) In two countries—Italy and Spain—the peak value and
option value eﬀects are typically not signiﬁcant and sometimes of the
wrong sign.4 Also in these two countries, the single year accrual eﬀect is
negative and signiﬁcantly related to retirement in four of the six cases.
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4. In the United Kingdom, the option value incentive measures are signiﬁcant when a
“bootstrap” method, which accounts for repeated observations on the same person, is used
to calculate standard errors. Also in the United Kingdom, both the peak value and the option
value incentive measures are very signiﬁcant—under conventional standard error esti-
mates—when cohort indicator, instead of age indicator, variables are used.The estimated eﬀect of SSW, however, is often not statistically diﬀerent
from zero and in many cases is of the wrong sign. In many countries, it is
likely easier to identify the eﬀect of the incentive measures than the eﬀect
of wealth levels. Because of program provisions, there is much more varia-
tion in the incentive measures than in SSW.
Thus, overall, the results from these twelve separate analyses seem amaz-
ingly consistent to us. The incentives inherent in retirement income pro-
grams are clear determinants of individual retirement behavior. The
estimates themselves strongly suggest a causal interpretation of the cross-
country results presented in our ﬁrst volume. The results point to an im-
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Table 2 Summary of Parameter Estimates, by Country and Speciﬁcation
Estimation Method (Incentive Measure)
Single Year Accrual Peak Value Option Value
Linear Age Linear Age Linear Age
Country Age Indicators Age Indicators Age Indicators
Belgium ACC:–* ACC:–* PV:–* PV:–* OV:–* OV:–*
SSW:–* SSW:–* SSW:–* SSW:–* SSW:– SSW:–
Canada ACC:–* ACC:–* PV:–* PV:–* OV:–* OV:–*
SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+*
Denmark ACC:+* ACC:–* PV:–* PV:–* OV:–* OV:–*
SSW:+* SSW:+ SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+*
France ACC:–* ACC:–* PV:–* PV:–* OV:–* OV:–*
SSW:–* SSW:–* SSW:–* SSW:– SSW:–* SSW:–*
Germany ACC:–* ACC:–* PV:–* PV:–* OV:–* OV:–*
SSW:– SSW:– SSW:– SSW:– SSW:– SSW:–*
Italy ACC:–* ACC:–* PV:+ PV:– OV:+ OV:–
SSW:–* SSW:– SSW:+ SSW:– SSW:+ SSW:+
Japan ACC:–* ACC:–* PV:–* PV:–* OV:–* OV:+
SSW:+ SSW:– SSW:– SSW:– SSW:+ SSW:–
The Netherlands ACC:+* ACC:+* PV:–* PV:–* OV:–* OV:–*
SSW:+* SSW:+ SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+*
Spain ACC:–* ACC:+ PV:–* PV:+ OV:– OV:+
SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:– SSW:+ SSW:+ SSW:+
Sweden ACC:–* ACC:– PV:–* PV:–* OV:–* OV:–*
SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+
United Kingdom ACC:–* ACC:– PV:– PV:– OV:–*  OV:–*
SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+* SSW:+*
United States ACC:+* ACC:+ PV:–* PV:–* OV:–* OV:–*
SSW:+* SSW:+ SSW:+* SSW:+ SSW:+ SSW:–*
Notes: See text for explanation of abbreviations. Regarding the United Kingdom, the option valued es-
timates are signiﬁcant when standard errors accounting for repeated observations for the same person
are used and when cohort indicator variables, instead of age indicators, are used. Both the option value
and the peak value incentive measures are very signiﬁcant.
Spain: The indications in this table pertain to the Regimen Especial Trabajores Autonomos (RETA)
employee group.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.portant relationship between incentive eﬀects and labor force participa-
tion, independent of cultural diﬀerences among countries. The magnitude
of the implied eﬀects are also vary comparably across countries, as shown
by the simulations discussed later.
Eligibility Ages and Retirement: A Key Empirical Regularity
The eﬀect on retirement of the changes in beneﬁt eligibility ages perhaps
presents the most diﬃcult prediction challenge of the project. Thus, we give
special attention to a consistent empirical regularity in retirement that
highlights this challenge. In each country, retirement rates are strongly re-
lated to particular eligibility ages prescribed in country-speciﬁc plan pro-
visions. Perhaps most importantly, retirement rates increase sharply at
ages of ﬁrst eligibility for beneﬁts. The age of ﬁrst eligibility may diﬀer from
person to person and varies by program (e.g., social security, disability, or
unemployment) in many countries. In the absence of eligibility for beneﬁts,
retirement is rare in each of the countries. One way to see this relationship
is to consider retirement hazard rates. The hazard rate shows the propor-
tion of persons employed at a given age who retire over the subsequent
year. The empirical regularity between hazard rates and eligibility ages
across countries is shown in some detail in the ﬁrst volume of the project.
Here, we show additional country examples that help to motivate, in par-
ticular, the simulation and estimation methods used in this volume.
United States
Labor force departure rates for men in the United States are shown in
ﬁgure 6. The hazard rates are close to zero before age ﬁfty-four and then in-
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Fig. 6 Hazard rates for men in the United Statescrease gradually through age sixty-one. All employees are eligible for social
security early retirement beneﬁts at age sixty-two, and there is a sharp jump
in the hazard rate at that age. The rise in departure rates at age ﬁfty-four
can be attributed not to the social security program, but to eligibility for
early retirement under employer-provided pension plans.
The importance of eligibility can be seen clearly in ﬁgure 7. This ﬁgure
shows hazard rates by pension plan coverage. The hazard rates for men
who have no private pension coverage and are covered only by the social
security program are indicated by the line with round markers. The hazard
rates for these persons are very close to zero until the social security early
retirement age, when they are ﬁrst eligible for retirement beneﬁts. At that
age, there is a sharp increase in the departure rate. The important feature
of the pattern is that there is essentially no retirement before that age.5
The other line in the ﬁgure shows the hazard rates for men who are cov-
ered by an employer-provided deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan. The early re-
tirement age under these plans is often age ﬁfty-ﬁve and is rarely over age
sixty. The hazard rates are very low before age ﬁfty-ﬁve. But for these em-
ployees, there is a sharp jump in the hazard rate at age ﬁfty-ﬁve, when many
in this group are ﬁrst eligible for beneﬁts. And then another jump at sixty-
two, when social security beneﬁts are ﬁrst available. If the early retirement
age for the U.S. social security program were raised from sixty-two to sixty-
ﬁve, for example, these data strongly suggest that the jump in the hazard
rate at age sixty-two would no longer occur at that age, but would shift to
age sixty-ﬁve instead. The critical question is whether the hazard rates
would remain close to zero until age sixty-two.
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Fig. 7 U.S. retirement hazards for men, social security only and employer
deﬁned beneﬁt
5. These rates are based on labor force participation rates of Health and Retirement Study
respondents. The precise age of departure from the labor force is obscured by the two-year in-
terval between survey waves, and thus the jump in the hazard rate does not match the early
retirement age of sixty-two exactly.Germany
The German social security system provides additional and perhaps bet-
ter examples. Figure 8 is analogous to ﬁgure 6 for the United States and
shows hazard rates, with respect to departure from the labor force, for men
in Germany. The detailed provisions of the 1972 social security legislation
(eﬀective until 1998) are mirrored in the retirement rates by age. In partic-
ular, there is a jump in the hazard rate at each important eligibility age. The
ages of key plan provisions are also noted on the ﬁgure so that the corre-
spondence between provisions and retirement is easily seen. Men who are
disabled or unemployed at age sixty and have a certain number of years of
employment under the social security system are eligible for early retire-
ment at that age. There is a corresponding large jump in the retirement at
that age. Men who have been employed for thirty-ﬁve years are eligible for
early retirement at age sixty-three, and there is a corresponding jump in the
retirement rate at that age. The normal retirement age is sixty-ﬁve and all
men are eligible for beneﬁts at that age. Again, there is a corresponding
spike at that age as well. (By age sixty-ﬁve, however, fewer than 29 percent
of men are still in the labor force in Germany.) In addition, even before age
sixty, liberal interpretation of disability and unemployment plan provi-
sions eﬀectively serves to provide early retirement beneﬁts, so that many
men are eligible for eﬀective early retirement before age sixty. There is a
corresponding jump in the hazard rates between ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-six.
Like the U.S. data, the German data also suggest that if the eligibility
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Fig. 8 Hazard rates for men in Germany20 Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise
Fig. 9 Germany: Retirement ages, ages before and after 1973 reform
Source: Data provided by Axel Börsch-Supan.
ages were increased, for example, the observed jumps in the hazard rates
would also shift upward. This sort of pattern is exhibited in all countries
and is shown in detail in the ﬁrst volume of the project.
The German system provides additional examples that reinforce the im-
portance of plan-speciﬁc eligibility ages. First, the provisions of the Ger-
man social security program were changed in 1972, as mentioned above.
Second, the provisions for men and women are diﬀerent. The diﬀerence in
the pre- and post-reform hazard rates, as well as the diﬀerence in the haz-
ard rates for men and women, highlight the point. Figure 9 shows the dis-
tribution of retirement ages for men under the social security system pro-
visions in 1970 and in 1976. Before the 1972 reform, retirement under the
social security program was essentially only possible at the normal retire-
ment age of sixty-ﬁve, and there is a correspondingly large spike in the dis-
tribution at that age. The 1972 reform provided for early (ﬂexible) retire-
ment at age sixty-three, and in 1976 there is a large concentration of
retirement at that age. Notice that retirement at ages before sixty and after
sixty-ﬁve was essentially unaﬀected by the change in plan provisions. The
change in hazard rates was essentially conﬁned to the ages aﬀected by the
legislation. (These data do not cover retirement under the disability andIntroduction and Summary 21
Fig. 10 Germany: Retirement ages 1973, 1976, and 1980
Source: Data provided by Axel Börsch-Supan.
unemployment programs before age sixty. Retirement under these pro-
grams, however, is evident in ﬁgure 8 and in ﬁgure 5.)
Figure 10 is like ﬁgure 9, but adds the distribution of retirement ages in
1980. After the 1972 reform, men quickly took up retirement at the early
retirement age of sixty-three—as seen in 1976. Over the next few years, re-
tirement through lenient disability and unemployment rules was increas-
ingly taken advantage of, and by 1980 a large retirement concentration at
age sixty (through these programs) is evident. Apparently, the ease of re-
tirement at the earlier age was not at ﬁrst recognized.
In addition, the eligibility ages for men and women diﬀer. The eﬀect of
the diﬀerences can be seen in ﬁgure 11. This ﬁgure shows the distribution
of retirement ages, under the social security system, for men and women in
1995. For both men and women there is a concentration of retirement at
age sixty-ﬁve, the normal retirement age. For both men and women, there
is also a concentration at age sixty, but for diﬀerent reasons. Age sixty is the
early retirement age for women, but for men, the concentration at age sixty
is due to eligibility for disability and unemployment beneﬁts at that age.
Women are also eligible for these beneﬁts at age sixty, if they have enough
years of employment. The key feature of this ﬁgure is the retirement be-
havior at age sixty-three. For men there is a concentration at age sixty-
three, the early (ﬂexible) retirement age. But this option is not available forwomen, and there is no concentration at age sixty-three for women (or, too
few women have enough employment years to retire at that age).
The United Kingdom
The U.K. program also has diﬀerent provisions for men and women.
Men can begin to receive beneﬁts under the public social security program
at age sixty-ﬁve; women can begin to receive beneﬁt at age sixty. These
diﬀerences are clearly reﬂected in the retirement patterns of men and
women, as shown in ﬁgure 12. This ﬁgure shows the labor force “survival
probabilities” for men and women who do not have an occupational pen-
sion. The proportion of women employees still in the labor force drops by
about 20 percentage points (from 60 to 40 percent) at age sixty, but there is
essentially no decline for men at this age. On the other hand, there is a 20
percentage point drop (from about 40 to about 20 percent) for men at age
sixty-ﬁve, when they can receive beneﬁts.
Thus within-country diﬀerences in labor force departure rates by gender,
by pension plan coverage, and over time show clearly that retirement is
strongly inﬂuenced by eligibility ages. It seems clear that diﬀerences in la-
bor force departure rates among countries are also strongly inﬂuenced by
diﬀerences in eligibility ages. We would like the estimation and simulation
methods used in the analysis to capture the essence of the empirical regu-
larity between beneﬁt eligibility ages and retirement and, at the same time,
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Fig. 11 Germany: Retirement ages for men and women in 1995
Source: Data provided by Axel Börsch-Supan.capture the eﬀect of the other plan incentive measures as previously de-
ﬁned. We give particular attention to this issue later.
Simulations: Method and Results
Simulation Method
Perhaps the best way to judge the implications of the country estimates
is to consider the simulations based on the estimates. Thus, the main focus
of this introduction is on the two illustrative simulations that are per-
formed for each of the countries. The ﬁrst simulation predicts the eﬀect of
delaying all program beneﬁt eligibility ages by three years. In countries in
which disability, unemployment, or other retirement pathways are impor-
tant, the eligibility age for each of the programs is delayed by three years.
The second simulation is intended to predict the eﬀect of the same reform
(the “common reform”) in each country. Under the common reform, the
early retirement age is set at age sixty and the normal retirement age at
sixty-ﬁve. Beneﬁts taken before age sixty-ﬁve are reduced actuarially by 6
percent for each year before age sixty-ﬁve. Beneﬁts taken after age sixty-
ﬁve are increased by 6 percent for each year the receipt of beneﬁts is de-
layed. In addition, the replacement rate at age sixty-ﬁve is set at 60 percent
of (projected) age-sixty earnings.
The simulations are summarized in the table 3. The country papers show
simulations done in nine diﬀerent ways. For each reform, simulations are
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Fig. 12 U.K. survival rates for men and womenbased on the accrual, the peak value, and the option value methods. For
each of these estimation methods, three simulation approaches are used.
The three simulation methods are based on diﬀerent uses of the age indi-
cators. In every case the simulations are done by recalculating the relevant
incentive (accrual, peak value, or option value) to correspond to the pro-
gram change. In addition to the incentive measure per se, the SSW measure
and wage earnings are also recalculated to correspond to the change in the
program. Then the retirement rates are reestimated using the new mea-
sures.
The key feature that distinguishes the three methods is the use of age in-
dicators. The ﬁrst simulation method (S1) does not use age indicators at all,
either in the estimation or in the simulation. Only a linear measure of age
is used as a control variable. In this case, only the incentive measures (and
the related variables) are recalculated to simulate the eﬀect of the reforms.
The second simulation method (S2) uses age indicators in the estimation,
but does not use the age indicators in the simulation. The third method (S3)
uses age indicators in the estimation and, in addition, uses adjusted age in-
dicators to simulate retirement under the program changes.
Method S2 likely minimizes the simulated eﬀect of the program changes.
The eﬀect of the incentive measures is estimated conditional on the indi-
vidual age indicators, but in predicting the eﬀect of program changes, the
simulations account only for the change in the incentive measures and do
not account for the age eﬀects. This will clearly understate the true eﬀect of
the program changes, assuming that there are important program eligibil-
ity age eﬀects.
Simulation method S3 may typically yield the largest simulated eﬀect of
the program changes. The estimated age indicator eﬀects, as well as the
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Table 3 Simulations
Simulation and Estimation Method
Common Reform—ER at 60,
NR at 65, replacement rate of
60% (of age 59 earnings) at 65,
6% reduction before 65,
6% increase after 65
Three-Year Delay in
Eligibility Ages
Peak Option Peak Option
Simulation Method Accrual Value Value Accrual Value Value
S1: Without age indicators X X X XXX
S2: With age indicators but 
without increment age eﬀects X X X X X X
S3: With age indicators and 
increment age eﬀects X X X XXX
Notes: ER = early retirement age; NR = normal retirement age.program incentive eﬀects, are used to predict the eﬀect of the program
changes. For example, for the three-year eligibility delay, the age indicator
for a given age is taken to be the estimated age indicator three years prior
to the given age. The age-sixty indicator, for example, is taken to be the es-
timated age-ﬁfty-seven indicator. The result is that under the three-year el-
igibility delay, the projected retirement rate at age sixty is approximatelythe
same as the current program age-ﬁfty-seven retirement rate. The spike at
the early retirement age under the current program, for example, shows up
there years later under the reform. This approach assumes that allof the es-
timated age eﬀects can be attributed to the eligibility-age program provi-
sions. (The ages include the age at which persons are eligible for one or
more programs, as well as the normal retirement age.)
Method S1 perhaps provides a middle ground. In this case, the estima-
tion method does not explicitly allow for increases in retirement at given el-
igibility ages, and thus these eﬀects are not allowed to inﬂuence the simu-
lated eﬀect of program changes. These eﬀects will only be reﬂected in the
simulations if they are captured by the estimated incentive eﬀects. Recall
that in our terminology, the incentive measures are the option value, the
peak value, and the single-year-accrual ﬁnancial measures; they do not in-
clude the eligibility age eﬀects per se, which may also reﬂect additional in-
centives. Changing the early entitlement age by three years, for example,
will change the incentive measures and SSW at every age, and the eﬀect of
this change is captured by the S1 simulations. But any other eligibility-age
eﬀects, such as social norms, liquidity constraints, or other reasons to re-
tire at given eligibility ages, are not captured by the S1 simulations.
As the simulation results reported afterwards show, method S3 most of-
ten yields the largest estimated eﬀect of program changes—but this is not
always the case. In several instances, method S1 yields larger eﬀects than
method S3.
In the next section of this introduction, we discuss simulation results
based on the option value (OV) estimation results and using the S1 and the
S3 simulation methods, marked by an X in the table. Without undue com-
plexity, this allows us to describe the general features of the results and to
direct attention to the most important issue in estimation and simula-
tion—the use of age indicators. We also focus solely on the results for men
for expositional convenience, but results for women as well as men are pre-
sented in each country’s chapter.
Simulation Results
We begin by considering the results for the three-year delay in program
eligibility. We ﬁrst show results based on S3. Then, for the three-year delay
simulation, we compare results based on S1 and S3. Next, we consider the
predicted eﬀects of the common reform, and then we compare results un-
der the common reform and under the three-year eligibility delay. Before
Introduction and Summary 25proceeding to cross-country comparisons, however, we brieﬂy explain why
country-to-country diﬀerences in simulated results should be expected.
Diﬀerences Across Countries
Although the overall simulated eﬀects of the illustrative reforms are
large in all countries, the magnitude of the eﬀect diﬀers from country to
country. There are several reasons for the diﬀerences: The ﬁrst and the
single most important reason is that the current programs diﬀer substan-
tially among countries, and thus the eﬀect of given reforms should diﬀer as
well. A second reason is that the data ﬁles upon which the estimates are
based diﬀer from country to country; in a few countries, the data pertain
to only a portion of the workforce. A third reason is that there may be
diﬀerences across countries in individual responses to a given incentive. A
fourth reason, related to the second, is that the precise calculation of the
incentive measures may diﬀer somewhat from country to country. A ﬁfth
reason is that the precise implementation of the simulations may diﬀer
among the countries. It is, of course, not possible to apportion the quanti-
tative eﬀect of each of these reasons.
The models described above are used to predict the eﬀect of program in-
centives (and other variables) on hazard rates, or the likelihood that a per-
son in the labor force at a given age will leave the labor force at that age.
The simulations begin with base hazard rates, that is, the predicted hazard
rates under the current program. Then new hazard rates are predicted
based on the provisions of the illustrative reform. These hazard rates are
then used to predict the proportion of persons out of the labor force at
given ages, and these proportions are used to determine the proportion of
persons out of the labor force in given age ranges, such as ﬁfty-six to sixty-
ﬁve. Thus any of the reasons for diﬀerences that aﬀect the base hazard rates
(under the current program) or the predicted hazard rates (under the illus-
trative reforms) will lead to diﬀerent results among the countries.
Three-Year Delay in Eligibility
Turning to cross-country comparisons, we begin with simulations of the
eﬀect of a three-year delay in eligibility. Results for men aged ﬁfty-six to
sixty-ﬁve are shown in ﬁgure 13. The ﬁgure shows the out-of-the-labor
(OLF) percentage for the base case and under the eligibility delay. The eli-
gibility delay estimates are based on S3. In all countries there is a notice-
able reduction in the proportion of men out of the labor force when the el-
igibility ages are increased by three years.
The comparison among countries may be confounded, however, by the
wide variation across countries in the age at which retirement begins. Thus,
the change in the proportion out of the labor force may vary more among
countries at younger ages than over the entire ﬁfty-six-to-sixty-ﬁve age
range. To help to standardize for this eﬀect, we deﬁne the ﬁrst age at which
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percent age.” Then we consider the ﬁve years beginning with the “25 per-
cent age”—“25 percent age plus four years.”
The results for the “twenty-ﬁve percent age plus four years age” range
are shown in ﬁgure 14, in which the “25 percent age” is shown at the top of
the bars for the base case. The “25 percent age” ranges from age ﬁfty-three
in Italy to age sixty-two in Spain and the United States. Within the
“twenty-ﬁve plus four years” age range, the OLF proportion is currently
(under the base case) between 40 and 50 percent in ten of the twelve coun-
tries. Within this more standardized age range, there is typically a greater
reduction in the OLF percent—when eligibility is delayed—than for the
ﬁfty-six-to-sixty-ﬁve age range.
The percent reduction in the OLF proportion for the “twenty-ﬁve per-
cent age plus four years” age range is shown in ﬁgure 15. The average
reduction is 47 percent, with a range from 14 percent in Canada to 77 per-
cent in Germany.
Figure 16 is a comparison of results under S1and S3. The ﬁgure shows
reductions in the OLF proportion for the “twenty-ﬁve percent age plus
four years” age range. Recall that under S1, predictions are based on
changes in the incentive measures alone, while under S3, age-speciﬁc indi-
cators are used as well.
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Fig. 13 OLF ages 56–65: Base versus three-year delay, OV-S3Fig. 14 OLF 25 percent age plus four years: Base versus three-year delay, 
OV-S3
Fig. 15 OLF change 25 percent age plus four years: Base versus three-year delay,
OV-S3There are two notable features of this ﬁgure. The ﬁrst is that the overall
reductions are large under either method, and in many of the countries,
thetwo methods yield quite similar results. The average reduction is 47 per-
cent under S3 and 28 percent under S1. Under S3, the reduction is at least
34 percent in eleven of the twelve countries. Even using S1, the reduction
is greater than 23 percent in six of the twelve countries (and in two of these
countries the reduction is greater under S1 than under S3). The reduction
is between 12 and 18 percent in four countries. Only in Italy and Japan is
the estimated eﬀect under S1 quite small. For the ﬁrst six countries—Spain,
the Netherlands, France, Canada, Germany, and Denmark—the two
methods yield rather similar results. In the ﬁrst eight countries, the reduc-
tion under S1 is at least 47 percent of the reduction under S3. Thus on the
whole, the reduction in the OLF proportion is large under either approach.
The second notable feature of the ﬁgure is the similarity across countries
in the reduction under S3. The reduction is between 34 and 55 percent in
nine of the twelve countries (in Germany and Sweden the reductions are 77
and 68 percent, respectively). This similarity reﬂects the similarity in the
estimated age eﬀects at program eligibility ages. In all countries, there are
spikes in the hazard rates at these program eligibility ages similar to those
for the United States and Germany (shown in ﬁgures 6 and 8).
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Fig. 16 OLF 25 percent age plus four years: Three-year delay, OV-S1 and OV-S3In summary, for almost every country, the estimates under either method
show very large reductions in the OLF proportion when program eligibil-
ity ages are raised. The reductions, however, are typically larger under S3,
which allows age-speciﬁc variables to capture the eﬀect of beneﬁt eligibil-
ity on retirement. Based on the strong empirical regularity between retire-
ment rates and program eligibility ages, as discussed previously and in the
ﬁrst volume, we believe that S3 likely provides the more tenable predictions
of the long-run reductions in the OLF proportions (although responses to
increases in eligibility ages may not parallel responses to reduction in eligi-
bility ages). However, even under the more restrictive S1—which does not
directly allow for eligibility age eﬀects—the predicted eﬀect of the delay in
eligibility ages is large in almost all countries.
Common Reform
We turn now to simulation results for the common reform. Recall that
the common reform has four key features: (a) It sets the normal retirement
age at sixty-ﬁve; (b) it sets the early retirement age at sixty; (c) beneﬁts are
reduced actuarially if they are taken before age sixty-ﬁve; and (d) the re-
placement rate at the normal retirement age is set (approximately) at 60
percent of age-ﬁfty-nine earnings. Figure 17shows the OLF proportion for
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Fig. 17 OLF ages 56–65: Base versus common reform, OV-S3the ﬁfty-six-to-sixty-ﬁve age range under the base case and under the com-
mon reform, based on S3. Only in Germany and in the Netherlands is the
OLF proportion reduced substantially. In ﬁve of the twelve countries, the
common reform increases the OLF proportion. But there appears to be no
clear pattern between the base-proportion OLF and the reduction in the
OLF proportion under the common reform. The variation in the OLF pro-
portion, relative to the base, is reduced under the common reform, but sub-
stantial variation across countries remains.
For the “twenty-ﬁve percent plus four years” age range, however, there
is a strong pattern regarding the change in the OLF percent. The OLF pro-
portion under the base and under the common reform for this age range is
shown in ﬁgure 18. In this ﬁgure, the countries are ordered by the “25 per-
cent age.” For the “twenty-ﬁve percent plus four years” age range it is clear
that the greatest reductions in the OLF proportion under the common re-
form are realized in the countries with the lowest “25 percent age” rates.
The change in the OLF proportion in the “twenty-ﬁve percent” age plus
four years age range is shown in ﬁgure 19. For the six countries with a “25
percent age” less than sixty, the average reduction in the OLF proportion is
44 percent. For the six countries in which the “25 percent age” is sixty or
more, there is, on average, a 4 percent increase in the OLF proportion.
Introduction and Summary 31
Fig. 18 OLF 25 percent age plus four years: Base versus common reform, OV-S3The systematic pattern of these results shows a strong correspondence
with intuition. For the countries with the lowest “25 percent age,” the com-
mon reform represents a substantial increase in the youngest eligibility age,
and the actuarial reduction means that beneﬁts at this age are much lower
than under the base country plans. Thus, for these countries, the OLF pro-
portion should decline under the reform, which is the case for every coun-
try but Canada. But for the countries with a “25 percent age” of sixty or
greater, the common reform may reduce the earliest eligibility age—as in
the United States—and may provide a greater incentive to leave the labor
force. In addition, the 60 percent replacement rate at the normal retire-
ment age represents an increase for some countries, like the United States,
and a reduction in the replacement rate for other countries. Consequently,
in three of these six countries, there is an increase in the OLF proportion
under the common-reform simulation, and on average there is an increase
in the OLF proportion. The seemingly anomalous result for Canada is ex-
plained by the fact that Canada is the only country in which the “25 per-
cent age” is below the nominal social security entitlement age; the “25 per-
cent age” is ﬁfty-eight, while the social security entitlement age is 60. In
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Fig. 19 OLF change 25 percent age plus four years: Base versus common reform,
OV-S3addition, Canada has relatively low beneﬁts at the early retirement age (age
60). Thus the common reform signiﬁcantly increases beneﬁt levels, provid-
ing an additional inducement to retirement.
The simulated changes under the common reform based on S1 and S3
are compared in ﬁgure 20. In each of the countries, both methods either
predict a reduction or an increase in the OLF proportion. Overall, the
magnitude of the simulated changes based on the two methods is rather
similar as well. The most apparent exceptions are Italy, Canada, and Ger-
many. Both methods, on average, show reductions in the OLF proportion
in the six countries with the lowest “25 percent age” rates and small
changes in the OLF proportion for the six countries with the highest “25
percent age” rates. The diﬀerences between the groups are more muted,
however, under S1. Based on S3, the average OLF change is –44 percent for
the ﬁrst six countries and 4 percent for the last six, as noted previously.
Based on S1, the OLF change is –21 percent for the bottom six countries
and –4 percent for the top six. Most of the diﬀerence between the methods
is accounted for by the diﬀerences for Italy, Belgium, Germany, and
Canada. (The anomalous result for Canada is already explained.) Again,
on the whole, the two methods suggest similar results. Like the simulated
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Fig. 20 OLF change 25 percent age plus four years: Base versus common reform,
OV-S1 and OV-S3eﬀects of the three-year eligibility delay, we believe that S3 is likely to give
the most reliable long run predictions.
Comparing the Three-Year Eligibility Delay and the Common Reform
Finally, ﬁgure 21 compares the results for the three-year eligibility delay
with the common-reform results. The ﬁgure is based on S3. It shows the
percent change from the base under the two reforms for the “twenty-ﬁve
percent plus four years” age range, which is shown as the label on the com-
mon-reform bars. Recall that the three-year delay reduces the proportion
out of the labor force in all countries. The average reduction in the OLF
proportion is 47 percent, and there is little diﬀerence in the “25 percent
age” (–49 percent for the six countries with the lowest “25 percent age”
rates and –45 percent for the six countries with the highest “25 percent
age” rates).
The results under the common reform, however, should depend on the
base program provisions. As shown in ﬁgure 19, for the ﬁrst six countries
the average reduction in the OLF proportion is –44 percent and for the last
six countries the average increase is 4 percent. In particular, under the com-
mon reform, beneﬁts are not available in any country until age sixty. For
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Fig. 21 OLF change 25 percent age plus four years: Three-year versus common
reform, OV-S3many countries, current beneﬁts are available well before age sixty. (The
“25 percent age” helps to identify the early eligibility countries.) In most of
these countries—Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Canada, and
Germany—the delay in eligibility should tend to reduce the OLF percent,
and this is the result in all of these countries, with the exception of Canada.
In addition, the actuarial reduction in beneﬁts if they are taken before the
age-sixty-ﬁve normal retirement age should tend to further reduce the
OLF percent in most of these countries. Moreover, the common reform
represents a reduction in the replacement rate in some of the countries. In
other countries, such as Spain and the United States, current beneﬁts are
not available until age sixty or later. In these countries the common reform
could increase the OLF proportion.
Overall, the relative eﬀects of the two reforms are plausible, lending cre-
dence to the estimation approach. Under the three-year eligibility delay,
which should reduce retirement ages in all countries, there is a reduction in
the OLF proportion in each countries, and in many countries, the reduc-
tion is very large. But for the common reform, the eﬀects should depend on
country-speciﬁc program provisions, as the simulations show.
Conclusions
Our introduction to the ﬁrst volume of the project concluded with a
striking graph showing a strong relationship across countries between so-
cial security program incentives to retire and the proportion of older per-
sons out of the labor force (ﬁgure 4 of this introduction). From the weight
of the evidence, we judged that the relationship was largely causal. The
strong response of retirement decisions to within-country changes in pro-
gram provisions over time, and to diﬀerent provisions for diﬀerent groups
at a point in time (shown in ﬁgures 6–12), also point to a casual relation-
ship between program provisions and retirement.
The results of the country analyses reported in this volume conﬁrm the
strong causal eﬀect of social security program retirement incentives on la-
bor force participation. But perhaps more importantly, the results in this
volume show the large magnitude of these eﬀects. Across twelve countries
with very diﬀerent social security programs and labor market institutions,
the results consistently show that program incentives accord strongly with
retirement decisions. The magnitude of the estimated eﬀects varies from
country to country, but in all countries, the eﬀects are large.
The magnitude is illustrated most clearly by the simulations reported in
each country’s paper, and we have emphasized the simulations in this in-
troduction. Considering the average across all countries, a reform that de-
lays beneﬁt eligibility by three years would likely reduce the proportion of
men aged ﬁfty-six to sixty-ﬁve out of the labor force between 23 and 36 per-
cent, perhaps closer to 36 percent in the long run. For the “twenty-ﬁve per-
Introduction and Summary 35cent plus four years” age range, the average reduction would likely be be-
tween 28 to 47 percent, and perhaps closer to 47 percent in the long run.
The eﬀects are much larger than this in some countries, and in virtually
every country, the eﬀects are large regardless of the estimation method.
On the other hand, an illustrative common reform—with early retire-
ment at age sixty, normal retirement age sixty-ﬁve, and actuarial reduction
in beneﬁts between sixty-ﬁve and sixty—has very disparate eﬀects across
the countries, depending on the provisions of the current program in each
country. For the countries in which the current modal retirement age is
younger than sixty, this reform typically implies a reduction in retirement
incentives, and under this reform, the simulated proportion of older per-
sons out of the labor force declines substantially in most countries. But for
countries in which the modal retirement age is sixty or older, this reform
may represent an increase in retirement incentives, and the proportion of
persons out of the labor force may increase, on average, in these countries.
The strong correspondence between the simulation results and a priori ex-
pectations lends credence to the estimation procedures used in the country
papers.
In short, the results in this volume provide an important complement to
the ﬁrst volume. The results leave no doubt that social security incentives
have a strong eﬀect on retirement decisions, and the estimates show that
the eﬀect is similar in countries with very diﬀerent cultural histories, labor
market institutions, and other social characteristics. While countries may
diﬀer in many respects, the employees in all countries react similarly to so-
cial security retirement incentives. The simulated eﬀects of illustrative re-
forms reported in the individual chapters make it clear that changes in the
provisions of social security programs would have very large eﬀects on the
labor force participation of older employees.
In the next stage of the project, we will use the estimation results and
simulation methods developed in this stage to estimate the ﬁnancial impli-
cations of changes in program provisions.
Appendix
Incentive Measures
In this appendix, we review the relationship between the two forward-
looking incentive measures—the option value and the peak value. Under
the option value formulation, the value at age t of retirement r is given by
V t(r)  ∑
r 1
S t




 S tEt(kBS(r)) 
36 Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wiseusing the Stock-Wise speciﬁcation. Here Y is future wage income and B is
social security beneﬁt income, which depends on the retirement age r. For
simplicity, the probabilities of being alive to collect the income or the ben-
eﬁts have been suppressed. The gain from postponing retirement to r, ver-
sus retiring at age t, is given by
V t(r)  ∑
r 1
S t
 S tEt(Y S
 )  ∑
S
S r
 S tEt(kBS(r))   ∑
S
S t
 S tEt(kBS(r)) .
If r∗ is the retirement year that gives the maximum expected gain, the op-
tion value is given by
OV t(r∗)  ∑
r 1
S t
 S tEt(Y S
 )   ∑
S
S r*
 S tEt(kBS(r∗))   ∑
S
S t
 S tEt(kBS(t))  
               .
Considering this equation, we can see that there are two ways to calculate
the option value used in the analyses in this volume: One way is to use prior
estimated values for the utility parameters  ,  , and k. The second is to set
assume a value for   and to set   k   1.
Multiple Pathways to Retirement and Combining Programs
In the United States, the social security program is the principle public
program route to retirement. Only a small fraction of older persons enter
retirement through the disability program. In some European countries,
however, there are several public programs that provide routes to retire-
ment. The case in Germany is discussed in the text and illustrated in ﬁgure
5. Thus, in considering the incentive to retire, it is important to recognize
that retirement incentives under several programs may matter. The key
question is which program, or programs, a person could choose to enter,
out of those available to a given person. For example, who could retire un-
der the disability program? In some instances, administrative provisions
limit the universe of persons who might be eligible. In other instances, a
large fraction of persons could be eligible, but which persons are eligible is
unknown. Thus, the incentives facing a given individual must be estimated
probabilistically. We would like to have the probability that each person is
eligible for each program. Suppose that the incentive measure under each
possible program is calculated for each person for each age. Then for each
age, these probabilities could be used to obtain a weighted incentive mea-
sure, in which the weights are the probabilities that the person is eligible for
each program. This is essentially an instrumental variable approach.









Introduction and Summary 37for each age, depending on administrative rules as well as individual at-
tributes. During the course of this part of the project, several diﬀerent ap-
proaches were tried in various countries. Eligibility for disability is a good
example. Based on administrative rules, it might be assumed that every per-
son is eligible for disability beginning at some age, or it might be assumed
that eligibility probabilities correspond to actual empirical take-up rates
by age and other variables (where the take-up rate is estimated based on
personal attributes). Here, it is implicitly assumed that the take-up rate for
a person with a given set of attributes represents, on average, the eligibility
rate for persons with that set of attributes. There is no correct way to do this
without knowing eligibility for a sample of persons and then being about
to predict eligibility. In few, if any, countries was this an option. Thus, for
the purposes of the estimates in this volume, we have elected to assign
weights based on empirical take-up rates. In this case the disability-
eligibility probability will typically increase with age, for example. (Devia-
tions from this method are noted in the individual chapters.)
To explain the procedure we use the situation in Denmark, which is likely
the most complicated of the country situations. Here are the programs in
Denmark, together with the eligibility age and information to determine
eligibility, are shown in table A.1. An important calculation is the proba-
bility that a person is eligible for social and disability pension (SDP). To
obtain the probability of SDP eligibility, the approach is to use actual take-
up rates by age, year, and sex cells, by disability level.
Suppose the calculation pertains to pension-based SSW. The goal is to
obtain a weighted measure based on the probability a person is eligible for
a speciﬁc program at a given age. At sixty-seven and beyond, a person is
only eligible for the old age pensions (OAP) and possibly the public em-
ployees pension (PEP). Persons who retire under other programs convert
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Table A.1
Program Eligibility Age Determine Eligibility Based On
PEW (post-employment wage) 60 to 66 Age and insurance fund information
TBP (transitional beneﬁts  55 to 59; unemployed  Age and insurance fund and unemploy-
program) at ages 50 to 59 during  ment information in two years prior to 
1994 to 1996 age
PEP (public employees  60 to 69 Employer pension contributions over 
pension) required period
SDP (social and disability  18 to 66 Probability: Based on observed partici-
pension) pation rates by age-year-gender in each 
of the three levels of the disability pro-
gram
OAP (old age pensions) 67 Age = 67to OAP and start receiving beneﬁts under that program at age sixty-seven.
Before age sixty-seven, a person could be eligible for the post employment
wage (PEW) or the transitional beneﬁts program (TBP), but not both. As-
suming that we know for sure whether a person is eligible for these pro-
grams, these are the potential sources of wealth:
SSW OAP, which is available to all persons;
SSW PEW, which could be available between ages sixty and sixty-six;
SSW TBP, which could be available between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-nine or
ﬁfty and ﬁfty-nine;
SSW PEP, which is available to public employees who meet certain criteria;
and
SSW SDP, which could be available even before age ﬁfty.
Now SSW OAP can be thought of as a base that is available to everyone. The
question is then what else is or might be available. Assuming that a person
is not eligible for either PEW or TBP (or PEP), but that the person is eligi-
ble for SDP with probability p, then the weighted average SSW would be
SSW   SSW OAP   p∗ max[0, (SSW SDP   SSW OAP)].
That is, with probability pthe person has more than SSW OAP (or, with prob-
ability p the person would have SSW SDP and with probability 1 – p the per-
son would have SSW OAP only). The formula as set out above accounts for
the (unlikely) possibility that SSW SDP is lower than SSW OAP, in which case
the disability option would be ignored. (SSW SDPcan be collected beginning
at an age much younger than sixty-seven, so it will almost surely be greater
than SSW OAP, which can only be received beginning at age sixty-seven.)
After age sixty, a person could be eligible for PEW, for example (if you
retire before you are eligible for this program you never get these beneﬁts).
In that case, SSW is
SSW   max(SSW OAP, SSW PEW) 
  p∗ max[0, (SSW SDP   max(SSW OAP, SSW PEW))].
That is, the certain amount in this case is max(SSW OAP, SSW PEW). Once
again, the maximum will almost surely be SSW PEW, since the person can
take beneﬁts SSW PEW, which incorporates beneﬁts SSW OAP beginning at age
sixty-seven. With probability p, the person could be eligible for more, as-
suming that SDP would provide more.
A similar procedure is used to estimate SSW in two consecutive years,
and from SSW in those two years, the social security accrual from one year
to the next can be calculated. The peak value and option value measures
are obtained in a similar fashion, but in these cases, wealth measures must
be calculated for all ages into the future.
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